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A bill before the Senate proposes to merge the antitrust powers of the Secretariat for
Economic Law (SDE) and the Secretariat for the Economic Monitoring (SEAE) into the
Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), thus creating a single antitrust
agency. In regards to merger control, it would abolish the market share threshold and
establish mandatory ex ante notification.
* This contribution was coordinated and edited by Susana Cabrera, Konstantin Jargens and Alvaro
Gonzilez of Garrigues.
* Individual contributors will be referred to at the discussion of each jurisdiction.
1. This report will be available at http://www.abanet.org/dch/conmmittee.cfm?com=IC7
2 2 000 .
* The contribution for Brazil was written by Bruno L. Peixoto of Lanna Peixoto Advogados.
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The SDE sought to introduce further transparency to antitrust proceedings and to im-
prove the leniency program by issuing a new draft regulation for public consultation. 2
B. MERGERS
The CADE ordered Coca-Cola to terminate a joint venture with Nestl6 and transfer all
its iced tea operations to the Swiss joint venture partner, Nestea, in order to obtain clear-
ance for the acquisition of Leao Junior, the leading iced tea producer.3
In the merger between Perdigao and Sadia, Brazil's leading food processors, the CADE
found that the transaction could lead to substantial concentration and pima facie anticom-
petitive effects. Thus, in view of the post-merger review system in force, CADE executed
an agreement with the parties freezing the integration and information sharing among the
companies and prohibiting them from implementing the transaction before the review was
concluded.4
C. AwnCOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Joining the DOJ and the European Commission (DG Comp) in the anti-cartel enforce-
ment network established to carry out multi-jurisdictional investigations, the SDE raided
refrigeration compressor producers in these authorities' first coordinated operation.5
D. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
The CADE fined AmBev for adopting a non-linear pricing and discounts loyalty pro-
gram that allegedly induced exclusivity and acquisition of target quantities. 6 But the deci-
sion was immediately stayed after AmBev filed suit alleging that the CADE had failed to
demonstrate harm to consumer welfare and that the SDE had violated due process during
the investigation.7
2. Joint Comments of the Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Antitrust Law, Section of Int'l Law, and Section of Criminal
Justice on Pub. Consultation No. 16/2009 of Brazil's Sec'y of Econ. Law (ABA, Chi., Ill.), Sept. 28, 2009, at 1,
available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/IC722000/relatedresources/Antitrust.com-
mentsSept2009.pdf.
3. Recofarma Industria do Amazonas Ltda. [Coca-Cola Group] and Leao Junior S.A., CADE Concentra-
tion Review No. 08012.001383/2007-91, June 17, 2009, available at http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?
c75caa69bb59df29f818091cee22e63dd53513e021f5.
4. Conselho Administrativo De Defesa Economico [Admin. Council for Econ. Def.], Revislo de Concen-
tragio de CADE, No. 08012.004423/2009-18 (June 8, 2009).
5. Press Release, Sec'y of Econ. Law of the Ministry ofJustice, Int'l Joint Operation to Combat the Cartel
(Feb. 18, 2009).
6. Conselho Administrativo De Defesa Economico, Processo Administrativo No. 08012.003805/2004-10
(July 24, 2009), available at http://www.cade.gov.br.
7. TRF-1, No. 2009.34.00.028766-7, Relator: 09.02.2009, R.T.R.F. (Braz.).
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E. COURT DECISIONS
In Nestle-Garoto v. CADE, 8 the Federal Court of Appeals remanded the CADE's deci-
sion blocking the merger in question, ruling that the CADE should have reviewed new
facts.
Associations of construction companies filed the first antitrust collective private action
in Brazil's legal history,9 seeking injunctive relief and damages for recidivist cartelization
by steel producers. A second collective action was filed by associations of hospitals against
suppliers of medical gases' 0 following an SDE investigation.
II. Canada*
The year 2009 saw the enactment of several far-reaching amendments to Canada's
Competition Act (the Act)."
The Act's merger review process has been much more closely aligned with that of the
United States. Thus, a notifiable transaction may not be completed until the expiry (or
early termination) of a thirty-day waiting period following notification.12 Before the ex-
piry of this thirty-day period, the Competition Bureau (Bureau) may issue a supplemen-
tary request for information, in which case the proposed transaction may not be
completed until thirty days after the requested information is provided.13
The "transaction size threshold" for pre-merger notification has been increased.' 4
Transactions will no longer be notifiable if the book value of the target's assets in Canada,
or its annual gross revenues from sales in or from Canada, do not exceed CDNS70 million
(approximately US$66.27 million's).16 This threshold will increase in subsequent years
according to a formula linked to changes in the inflation rate.
Effective March 12, 2010, the amendments will repeal the Act's existing conspiracy
offense and replace it with a per se criminal prohibition of hardcore infringements.' 7 Un-
like the current conspiracy provision, the new offense will not require proof that the con-
spiracy, if implemented, would prevent or lessen competition unduly.' 8 Liability can be
avoided, however, if the agreement is ancillary to a broader agreement that does not con-
travene the law and is necessary for giving effect to the objective of that broader agree-
ment.19 Maximum penalties under the new offense are fourteen years imprisonment and a
CDN$25 million (approximately US$23.69 million) fine per count, up from the current
8. TRF-1, No. 2005.34.00.015042-8, Relator: 24.05.2005, R.T.R.F. (Braz.).
9. TRF-1, No. 2009.34.00.035755-7, Relator: 21.10.2009, R.T.R.F. (Braz.).
10. TRF-1, No. 002409709934-5, Relator: 19.01.2010, R.T.R.F. (Braz.), available at http://www.
tjmg.jus.br/juridicolsf/proc-resultado.jsp?listaProcessos=09709934&comrCodigo=24&numero=1.
* The contribution for Canada was written by Mark Katz and Elisa Kearney of Davies Ward Phillips &
Vineberg.




15. The amounts in USS are based on November 30, 2009 exchange rates.
16. The previous threshold was CDN$50 million (approximately US$47.33 million).
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maximums of five years imprisonment and CDN$10 million (approximately US$9.47 mil-
lion) per count.20
Also effective March 12, 2010, all other agreements between competitors that have the
effect of lessening or substantially preventing competition will be dealt with under a new
civil provision.21 The Bureau will be able to apply to the Competition Tribunal under this
new provision for an order to remedy the effects of such agreements.
m. Chile*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Chilean Antitrust Statute22 was amended in October 2009. Noteworthy changes
include greater investigative powers for the Antitrust Attorney General, with far-reaching
instruments for the detection of cartels, a leniency program affording full fine immunity
to the first cartel member that provides substantial information leading to collusion being
shown, and fine reductions of up to fifty percent for subsequent informers.23 In addition,
cartel members now face increased fines, and the limitation period for horizontal agree-
ments is raised from two to five years. 24 Congress is currently discussing a new bi1125 that
would establish criminal penalties for individuals involved in collusive behavior, including
up to five years imprisonment.
B. ANTrCOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
In December 2008, the Antitrust Attorney General filed a claim against the three main
pharmaceutical companies, Salcobrand, Cruz Verde, and FASA, alleging a conspiracy to
increase prices.26 The suspected agreement enraged consumers and led to political action,
including several bills establishing criminal punishment for collusive behavior.27 The case
took an abrupt turn in March 2009, when FASA pleaded guilty and settled with the Anti-
trust Attorney General, while Salcobrand and Cruz Verde insisted on their innocence.28
Although at the time of the settlement the Chilean Antitrust Law did not include a leni-
ency mechanism, the Antitrust Court approved the agreement by which FASA was re-
leased from all charges and received a substantial fine reduction. 29 The final decision
regarding Salcobrand and FASA is still pending.
20. Id.
21. Id.
* The contribution for Chile was written by Lorena Pavic and Juan Coeymans from Carey y Cia.
Abogados.
22. Ley No. 20.361, de 13 Julio de 2009 (Chile).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Bill N. 6438-03, Apr. 2, 2009 (Chile), available at http://sil.congreso.cl/cgi-bin/siltramitacion.
pl?6832,D.
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C. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
In July 2009, the Antitrust Court ruled against four sanitary companies 30 for imposing
unjustified and abusive prices and conditions on consumers located outside their conces-
sion areas. The Court imposed fines of more than US$1 million and proposed a legisla-
tive amendment by which sanitary companies defined as essential facilities should be
forced to supply interconnections to other companies under a fixed-rate system.
IV. Colombia*
A. LEGIsIATrvE DEVELOPMENTS
Law 1340, 2009, published on July 24, 2009 (the New Act), states that the Superinten-
dency of Industry and Commerce (SIC) is the only antitrust authority with merger control
jurisdiction, with the exception of transactions between financial institutions and commer-
cial agreements between air transport companies, which are reviewed by the Finance Su-
perintendency and the Air Transport Authority respectively.3
The New Act introduces mandatory notification for concentrations where the under-
takings concerned carry on the same activity or participate in the same value chain and
their turnovers or value of their assets in the fiscal year prior to the proposed transaction
exceed the threshold set by the SIC.32 The threshold can be met by one party alone or
both parties together.33
But if the parties have a joint market share of less than twenty percent of the relevant
market, the proposed operation is deemed to be automatically authorized by the SIC.
Where this occurs, the parties must notify the SIC, and give a description of the
transaction. 34
Where the parties' market share exceeds twenty percent, the procedure has changed
substantially. There is now a thirty-day pre-evaluation period and a notice of the transac-
tion must be published in any national newspaper, so that interested third parties may
provide information within ten days after said publication. 35 The whole procedure may be
extended by up to five months at the SIC's discretion.36
In addition, in certain circumstances the competition authority may unwind a merger.
The New Act increases considerably the fines imposed on undertakings and individuals
for breaches of the antitrust rules and establishes a leniency program which offers total or
partial immunity from fines in return for cooperation with the SIC in infringement pro-
30. Rep. of Chile Court of Def. of Free Competition, Ruling 85/2009, July 2, 2009, available at http://mail
web.fne.gob.cl/db/tabla.nsf/f34cb3b7c2bb5deb8425733e005faal 8/f2b24583daf2044842575e700761d29/$
FTLE/Sentencia%2085.pdf.
* The contribution for Colombia was written by Mauricio Jaramillo of G6mez Pinz6n Zuleta Abogados
SA.
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In 2009, three bills3 ' were introduced before the Mexican Congress, aimed at amending
antitrust regulation and granting the Federal Competition Commission (the FCC) new
powers and tools to enable it to enforce competition law more effectively. The first bill
proposes increasing fines for monopolistic practices, simplifying merger notification pro-
cedures, sanctioning per se conducts as a criminal offense, and widening the FCC's en-
forcement powers. 38 The other two bills foresee amending the Federal Penal Code in
order to sanction per se violations as a criminal offense and the Federal Law on Consum-
ers Protection in order to empower the Procuradurfa Federal del Consumidor
(PROFECO) to present class actions before the FCC.39
B. MERGERS
In the first semester of 2009, seventy-three mergers were reviewed. Of these: (i) thirty-
six were cleared; (ii) one was closed because the parties decided not to proceed; (iii) two
were prohibited; and (iv) the remaining thirty-four were corporate restructurings. Two
mergers are worth highlighting; the merger in the chemical industry between Mexichem
and Cydsa was prohibited@ but is now under appeal, while the merger between GM de
Mixico/Grupo Cinemex41 in the movie market was cleared without conditions.
* The contribution for Mexico was written by Lucia Ojeda of SAI Abogados.
37. Senators' Bills introduced by Senators Santiago Creel Miranda and Juan Bueno Torio. Senator Santi-
ago Creel Miranda, SE TURNO A LAS COMISIONES UNIDAS DE COMERCIO Y FOMENTO IN-
DUSTRIAL; Y DE ESTUDIOS LEGISLATIVOS, SEGUNDA, Senate Official Gazette No. 370, Apr. 21,
2009, available at http://www.senado.gob.mx/gace61.php?ver=gaceta&sm=1001&id=1 32 26&lg=60 [hereinaf-
ter Gazette No. 370]; Senator Juan Bueno Torio, SE TURNO A LAS COMISIONES UNIDAS DE JUS-
TICIA; DE COMERCIO Y FOMENTO INDUSTRIAL; Y DE ESTUDIOS LEGISLATIVOS DE LA
CAMARA DE SENADORES, Senate Official Gazette No. 18, July 2, 2008, available at http://www.
senado.gob.mx/gace.php?sesion=2008/07/02/l&documento=25 [hereinafter Gazette No. 18]; Senator Juan
Bueno Torio, SE TURNO A LAS COMISIONES UNIDAS DE COMERCIO Y FOMENTO INDUS-
TRIAL; Y DE ESTUDIOS LEGISLATIVOS, PRIMERA, Senate Official Gazette No. 347, Mar. 11, 2009,
available at http://www.senado.gob.mx/gace.php?sesion=2009/03/l1/1&documento=17 [hereinafter Gazette
No. 347].
38. Gazette No. 370, snpra note 37.
39. Gazette No. 18, snipra note 37; Gazette No. 347, sapra note 37.
40. Decision not yet published.
41. Press Release, Fed. Competition Comm'n, Larrea Cofeco Authorizing the Purchase of Cinemax
(Dec.16, 2008), available at http://201.161.46.75/index.phpoption=comcontent&task=view&id=6048&Item
id=206.
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C. ANTICOMPETTIVE PRACTICES
During 2009, four investigations were initiated for alleged per se conduct. The markets
involved were cathode ray tubes,42 hermetic compressors,43 crystal panels and compo-
nents,44 and optical disc readers,45 all initiated under the Leniency Program. 46
In June 2009, the FCC imposed an unprecedented maximum fine on Ferromex, Fer-
rosur, and their respective holding companies for price fixing.47 In July 2009, the FCC
fined thirty-three economic agents involved in the real estate market in Chapala. 48 This
investigation is the first concluded under the Leniency Program.
D. ABUSES OF A DomiNorr PosrnoN
In July 2009, the FCC issued its first preliminary resolution considering Telmex to be
the dominant operator in the market for local transit and leasing of dedicated transmission
links.49 In October 2009, the FCC issued a second resolution finding that Telmex has
substantial power in the public switched voice transit market through a public telecommu-
nications network for fixed local services that provides long-distance services to other au-
thorized telecommunications networks.50 The FCC will now be able to apply sector-
specific obligations to dominant operators.
E. COURT DECISIONS
In September 2000, the FCC ordered the divestiture of a joint venture called Presta-
ciones Universales, set up by various supermarket chains for the joint issuance of food
coupons.si
42. Diario Oficial de Mexico (DOF) [Official Government Gazette], Aug. 5, 2009.
43. Diario Oficial de Mexico (DOF) [Official Government Gazette], June 18, 2009.
44. Haddon Ruiz, OraciutL GovERNmENT GA.ZEYE, Mar. 7, 2009, available at http://dof.gob.mx/
nota-detalle.php?codigo=509773 I&fecha=03/07/2009.
45. Haddou Ruiz, Overcut. GOVERNMENr GAZETTE, July 10, 2009, available at http://dof.gob.mx/
nota.detalle.php?codigo=5113176&fecha=07/10/2009.
46. Ley Federal De Competencia Economica [Fed. Law on Econ. Competition], Diario Oficial de Mexico,
25 de April de 2006 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mxfLeyesBiblio/pdf/104.pdf.
47. Press Release, Fed. Competition Comm'n, CFC Fine Chapala Realtors (May 2009), available at http://
201.161.46.75/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=6752&Itemid=204.
48. Press Release, Fed. Competition Comm'n, CFC Imposes Fines for 419.1 Million Pesos (Mar. 2009),
available at http://201.161.46.75/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=6628&Itemid=204.
49. See FCC's Preliminary Resolution, Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://www.cfe.gob.nx/images/stories/
Documentos/resolucionessinbuscadordc-04-2007.pdf.
50. Haddou Ruiz, OraciuL GOVENMEr GAZETTE, Oct. 14, 2009, available at http://dof.gob.mx/
nota-detalle.php?codigo=5114350&fecha=14/10/2009.
51. FCC Cases DE-27-99 and RA-46-2000 Prestaciones Universales/Prestaciones Mexicanas/Almacenes
Aurrerd/Gigante/Grupo Comercial Chedrani, available at http://201.161.46.75/images/stories/gacetas/
gaceta 0 9/ 04_Investigaciones.pdf.
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VI. United States*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Obama Administration has signaled a more aggressive stance to antitrust enforce-
ment. Notably, under Christine A. Varney, the new Assistant Attorney General for Anti-
trust at the Department of Justice (DOJ), the DOJ's Antitrust Division has withdrawn its
September 2008 report regarding Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which regulates single
firm conduct. 52 According to Ms. Varney, the report "raised many hurdles to Govern-
ment Antitrust Enforcement."5 3 Two months later, the DOJ, reversing its prior position,
joined the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in criticizing reverse payment settlements in
pharmaceutical patent disputes.5 4 The DOJ's recent investigations of Google and IBM,
and the FTC's investigation of Intel, demonstrate the agencies' increasing attention to
high-tech and Internet-based markets.5 5
B. MERGERS
The FTC and DOJ have announced plans to revise their joint Merger Guidelines to
reflect more accurately today's business and legal environment.5 6
Several consummated, non-reportable deals were challenged, including Microsemi/
Semicoa (semiconductors),57 and Carillon Clinics (outpatient medical clinics).5 8 Many
other mergers required divestitures, including Merck/Schering-Plough (pharmaceuti-
cals)5 9 and Pfizer/Wyeth (pharmaceuticals).60 Other notable transactions that were
* The contribution for the United States was written by Claire Webb and Ausra 0. Pumputis of Weil,
Gotshal & Manges.
52. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCr UNDER SECTION
2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.
53. Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust Div., Vigorous Antitrust
Enforcement in this Challenging Era (May 12, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
245777.htm.
54. See Brief for the US in Response to the Court's Invitation, Ark. Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v.
Bayer AG, No. 05-2851(2d Cir. July 6, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f247700/247708.
htm.
55. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the U.S. Regarding Proposed Class Settlement, Authors Guild, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f250100/250180.
hbm; see also Ashlee Vance & Steve Lohr, US Begins Antitrust Inquiry ofIBM, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at Bl,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/technology/companies/08antitrust.htnl; see also Diane
Bartz, US Closer to Filing Complaint Against Intel: Sources, REUTTERS, Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE59M4WM20091023.
56. Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, Dep't ofJustice and Federal Trade Comm'n to Hold Workshops Con-
cerning Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
press.releases/2009/250236.htn.
57. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Dep't Reaches Settlement with Microsemi Corp. (Aug. 20,
2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2009/249246.htm.
58. Press Release, Fed. Trade Conm'n, Comm'n Restores Competition Eliminated by Carilion Clinic's
Acquisition of Two Outpatient Clinics (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://www2.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/
carilion.shtn.
59. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Order Restores Competition Lost Through Schering-
Plough's Acquisition of Merck (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/merck.shtm.
60. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Order Prevents Anticompetitive Effects from Pfizer's Acqui-
sition of Wyeth (Oct. 14, 2009), available at http-/www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/pfizer.shtm.
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cleared with consent orders include Hexion/Huntsman (epoxy)61 and BASF/Ciba Hold-
ings (high performance pigments). 62 Oracle/Sun Microsystems was cleared without
conditions.63
The FTC sought and obtained a preliminary injunction to block CCC/Mitchell.64 The
FTC has challenged several other mergers, including Thoratec/HeartWare (left ventricu-
lar devices) 65 and Talecris/CSL (plasma-derivative protein therapies), 66 resulting in the
merger plans being abandoned.
A district court provided guidance on the degree of permissible information exchange
with a competitor during merger negotiations in Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group,
Inc.67
C. CRIINAL ENFORCEMENT
Criminal antitrust penalties, both fines and prison terms, significantly increased in
2009. U.S. criminal antitrust fines exceeded one billion dollars in 2009, and the DOJ
sentenced an executive to a forty-eight month prison term-the longest prison term ever
imposed on an individual in the United States for a single antitrust charge.68
D. COURT DECISIONS
In contrast to the agencies' heightened enforcement efforts, the Supreme Court has
continued to narrow the scope of substantive antitrust claims. Most recently, the Court
ruled in favor of a private antitrust defendant (for the tenth consecutive time in the past
five years) and rejected a price squeezing claim in Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns,
Inc.69 The Court held that in the absence of an antitrust duty to deal, AT&T, which was
both a retail competitor and a wholesale supplier of DSL service, was under no duty to sell
wholesale services to its competitors at any particular price.
In January 2010, the Court heard arguments in Am. Needle v. Nat'l Football League re-
garding the treatment of joint ventures under antitrust law-specifically, the scope of sin-
gle entity immunity from Sherman Act Section 1 violations.70
61. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Intervenes in Hexion's Proposed Acquisition of Huntsman
Corp. (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/10/hexion.shtm.
62. Press Release, Fed.Trade Comm'n, FTC Intervenes in BASF's Proposed $5.1 Billion Acquisition of
Ciba Holding Inc. (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/04/basf.shtm.
63. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Dep't of Justice Antitrust Div. Issues Statement on the European
Comm'n Decision Regarding the Proposed Transaction Between Oracle and Sun (Nov. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2009/251782.htm.
64. See FTC v. CCC Holdings et al., No. 08-2043 (D.D.C. 2009).
65. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Authorizes Suit to Stop CSL's Proposed $3.1 Billion Acquisi-
tion of Talecris Biotherapeutics (May 27, 2009), available at http-//www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/05/talecris.shun.
66. Id.
67. See Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
68. See Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Former Shipping Executive Sentenced to 48 Months in Jail for His
Role in Antitrust Conspiracy (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/
2009/242030.htm.
69. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009).
70. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, No. 08-661 (S. Ct. argued Jan. 13, 2010). The DOJ and
FTC have submitted an amicus brief urging the Court to adopt a two-step analysis evaluating the extent of
SPRING 2010




On July 24, 2009, two new criminal offenses7i and two recast civil prohibitionS72 on
"cartel provisions" were introduced into the Trade Practices Act 1974 (the TPA).
Individuals found guilty of engaging in cartel conduct now face up to ten years' impris-
onment and fines of up to AUD$500,000 (approximately US$457,375). Companies face
fines up to the greater of (i) AUD$10 million (approximately US$9.11 million), (ii) three
times the value of the benefit attributable to the cartel as a whole, or (iii) where the value
cannot be determined, ten percent of the corporation's annual turnover.73
B. ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTcEs
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has brought a total
of eleven proceedings against airlines for alleged price fixing in the air cargo industry and
has foreshadowed more. Some airlines have settled. In February 2009, three airlines were
fined AUD$16 million (approximately US$14.6 million) for breaching the price fixing
provisions of the TPA.74 Combined with fines imposed on Qantas and British Airways,
the total penalties ordered to date, in respect to the alleged cartels, totals AUD$41 million
(approximately US$37.87 million).75 Some penalties have been contested.
Since December 2008, the ACCC has commenced five contested proceedings against
airlines for alleged price fixing contraventions in relation to fuel surcharges applied to
international carriage of cargo.76
the merger of operations and the effect on competition between the parties outside of the merged operations
to determine whether the single entity treatment is qualified.
* The contribution for Australia was written by Paul Schoff and Jing Chua of Minter Ellison.
71. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, §§ 44ZZRF, 44ZZRG (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.aul
ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilation l.nsfl0/8 IA2BC 1 5858A9C6 I CA257678008115E2/$filefTradePrac
1974VollWDO2.pdf.
72. Id. §§ 44ZZRJ, 44ZZRK.
73. Trade Practices Act § 79; see also §§ 44ZZRF, 44ZZRG, 44ZZRJ, 44ZZRK Individuals who breach
the criminal provisions face fines of up to AUD$220,000 (approximately US$201,234).
74. See Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm'n, Court Orders Airlines to Pay a Total of
$16 Million in Penalties for Price Fixing (Feb. 16, 2009) (Soci6td Air France & Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maat-
schappij NV paid AUDS16 million (approximately US$5.4 million), Martinair Holland INV, AUD$5 million
and Cargolux International Airlines S.A. paid AUD$5 million (approximately US$4.7 million)), available at
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/861037/fromltemld/142.
75. Id.
76. Since December 2008, the ACCC has brought proceedings against Singapore Airlines Cargo Pte Ltd.,
Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., Emirates, PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd. and Thai Airways. See Press Release,
Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm'n, ACCC Institutes Proceedings Against Thai Airways for Alleged
Price Fixing of Air Freight (Oct. 28, 2009), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemld/
899383/fromItemId/142.




The first year of China's new Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) 77 has seen significant pro-
gress in terms of both legislation and enforcement. Three government agencies share
responsibility for AML enforcement: the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), responsi-
ble for merger review; the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), re-
sponsible for non-merger, non-price-related monopoly agreements, abuses of dominance,
and administrative abuses; and the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC), responsible for price-related conduct. An Anti-Monopoly Commission (AMC)
oversees and coordinates enforcement by the three agencies.
Several implementing regulations and guidelines have been issued or have been pub-
lished for public comments.
B. MERGERS
MOFCOM blocked Coca-Cola's proposed acquisition of Chinese juice maker
Huiyuan,78 and conditionally approved five others: InBev-Anheuser-Busch, 79 Mitsubishi-
Lucite,80 GM-Delphi,81 and Pfizer-Wyeth.82 All but Coca-Cola involved offshore trans-
actions not focused on China.
MOFCOM's analysis has become increasingly sophisticated, but concerns unrelated to
competition, such as the protection of domestic competitors, also play an important part
in the review process. Structural remedies involving divestures appear to be favored.
Between August 2008 and June 2009, MOFCOM received more than 100 merger noti-
fications and formally accepted fifty-eight, of which forty-six were decided. Approxi-
mately ten percent of these decisions were either prohibited or given conditional
clearance. Other cases are understood to have been subjected to a second-phase review,
but then approved without conditions being attached.
MOFCOM's review procedures remain relatively non-transparent and unpredictable.
Parties must allow additional time for "acceptance" of a filing as complete before the
thirty-day initial review period begins. Second-phase reviews may take up to ninety addi-
tional days (extendable by another sixty days).
* The Contribution for China was written by Peter Wang and Yizhe Zhang of Jones Day.
77. Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat' People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effec-
tive Aug. 1, 2008), translated in CHINA.ORG.CN (last visited Feb. 2, 2010) (P.R.C.).
78. Press Release, Ministry of Commerce, Announcement No. 22, Coca-Cola (Mar. 18, 2009), translated in
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/03/18/chinaE2%80%
99s-statement-blocing-coca-cola-huiyuan-deal/.
79. Press Release, Ministry of Commerce, Announcement No. 95, Inbev (Nov. 18, 2008), available at http:/
/fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200811/20081105899216.html.
80. Press Release, Ministry of Commerce, Announcement No. 28, Mitsubishi/Lucite (Apr. 24, 2009), avail-
able at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200904/20090406198805.html.
81. Press Release, Ministry of Commerce, Announcement No. 76, GM/Delphi (Sept. 28, 2009), available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zmtx2009O9/20090906540211 .html.
82. Press Release, Ministry of Commerce, Announcement No. 77, Pfizer/Wyeth (Sept. 29, 2009), available
at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200909/20090906541443.html.
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C. CARTELS AND ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
No formal enforcement actions have yet been reported by either the SAIC or the
NDRC, although the SAIC disclosed in July that it had already received over fifty com-
plaints, 83 and rumors exist of NDRC investigations into airfare pricing. 84
D. COURT DECISIONS
The Shanda-Sursen85 case, the first judgment under the AML, provides an indication of
how Chinese courts will weigh the evidence in deciding whether a defendant has a domi-
nant market position, when considering allegations of abuse of dominance. The court also
appeared open to hearing possible justifications for such alleged abuses of dominance.
m. India*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Earlier this year, the Competition Act, 2002 (the Act), which replaced the Monopolies
and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, was partially brought into force. 86 Other than
the merger control provisions, which have not yet entered into force, the sections of the
Act dealing with anti-competitive agreements and abuses of dominance have become law.
The new regime under the Act is administered and enforced by the Competition Com-
mission of India (CCI). CCI orders can be appealed to the Competition Appellate Tribu-
nal and ultimately to the Supreme Court of India, while the jurisdiction of the civil courts
has been specifically excluded.
Under the Act, any agreement that causes, or is likely to cause, an appreciable adverse
effect on competition (AAEC) in India is void. Horizontal agreements that, for example,
determine prices or limit production are presumed to cause an AAEC. This presumption,
however, is not applicable to efficiency-enhancing joint ventures between competing en-
terprises or other horizontal cooperation agreements, which would be assessed by apply-
ing a rule of reason analysis.
Also, vertical agreements are subject to the same rule of reason analysis under the Act
and are only prohibited if they cause an AAEC in India. The Act also prohibits the abuse
of a dominant position.
83. See Sang Lin, Dir. of the Anti-Monopoly Div., Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Bureau of
the State Admin. for Indus. and Commerce Enforcement Bureau, 6th Int'l Symposium on Competition Law
and Policy Ouly 4, 2009).
84. See TravelSky Technology under NDRC Investigation About Airfare Pricing Monopoly, SINA.cOM
(P.R.C.), May 15, 2009, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090515/22566233643.shtml.
85. Shanghai Fint Anti-Monopoly Suit Tried, NTD INTELL. PROP. NEWSL., July 10, 2009, http://www.chi-
nantd.com/en/en-newsshow.asp?id= 1055.
* The contribution for India was written by Pallavi S. Shroff and Harman Singh Sandhu of Amarchand &
Mangaldas & Suresh A. Shroff & Co.
86. The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003, available at http://www.
cci.gov.in/images/media/competitionact/act2002.pdfphpMyAdmin=NMPFRahGKYeu5F74Ppstn7RfAO.
Notification numbers 770, 771, & 772 issued by the Government of India, published in the Official Gazette
of India of May 15, 2009.
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B. ANTICOMPETITIVE PRA=CTCES
The CCI is currently investigating several complaints, including allegations that the
Multiplex Owners Association of India is a cartel,87 the interoperability of set-top boxes
provided by the Direct-to-Home service providers," a complaint against a code-sharing
agreement between Kingfisher Airlines and Jet Airways, 89 and competition aspects of pre-




In 2009, the European Commission adopted a new draft Insurance Block Exemption
Regulation and reviewed its existing rules applicable to vertical agreements, motor vehicle
distribution and after-sales services, and the exemption for liner shipping consortia.91 The
Commission also published its final report following its inquiry into the pharmaceutical
sector, finding, inter alia, that market entry of generic drugs is delayed due to the actions
of originator companies and the regulatory framework. 92 Its attempt to boost private en-
forcement stumbled in the home stretch, when the draft directive was taken off the sched-
ule for a meeting of Commissioners following resistance from Commission President
Barroso and some Members of the European Parliament.93
B. MERGERS
The overall number of merger cases dealt with by the European Commission decreased
significantly in 2009 compared to the crest of the merger wave in 2007. Of the five sec-
ond-phase reviews that the Commission initiated in 2009, the Lufthansa acquisitions of
87. Case No. 1/2009 [not yet listed in reporter]; see Moumita Bakshi & Chatterjee Varada Bhat, Multiplex
Association Approaches Competition Commission Against Producers, HINDu Bus. LiNE, May 28, 2009, http://www.
thehindubusinessline.com/2009/05/2 9/stories/200905295088 1100.htm.
88. Case No. 2/2009 [not yet listed in reporter].
89. Case No. 4/2009 [not yet listed in reporter]; see Press Trust of India, Code Sharing Pact Between Jet,
Kingfisher Under CCI Scanner, Bus. STANDARD, Aug. 21, 2009, http://www.business-standard.com/india/
news/code-sharing-pact-between-jet-kingfisher-under-cci-scanner/71435/on.
90. Case No. 5/2009 [not yet listed in reporter]; see Press Trust of India, Banks Under CCI Scanner for Pre-
payment Penalty on Home Loans, Bus. STANDARD, Nov. 2, 2009, http://www.business-standard.com/india/
news/banks-under-cci-scanner-for-pre-payment-penaltyhome-loans/773 72/on.
* The contribution for the European Union was written by Gunnar Wolf and Michael Clancy of
Covington & Burling.
91. See European Comm'n, Legislation, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.
html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
92. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, FtNAL REPORT ON THE COMPETITION INQUIRY INTO THE PHARMACEUTI-
CAL SECTOR (2009), avadable at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html.
93. SeeJim Brunsden, Kroes Hopefid ofDeal on Compensation Claims, EUROPEAN VOICE, Oct. 10, 2009, http:/
/www.curopeanvoice.com/article/imported/kroes-hopeful-of-deal-on-compensation-claims/6605 5.aspx.
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both Brussels Airlines and Austrian Airlines and Oracle's acquisition of Sun Microsystems
stand out.94
C. AwnCOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The Commission made it repeatedly clear that the best way out of the severe economic
crisis is through robust and rigorous enforcement of the competition rules. 95 Thus, the
Commission continued its trend of imposing high fines on companies found to infringe
the competition laws, including a C1.06 billion fine imposed on Intel for allegedly provid-
ing anticompetitive loyalty rebates and a C1.106 billion (approximately US$1.59 billion)
fine on E.ON and GDF Suez-C553 million (approximately US$831.7 million) each-for
involvement in a market-sharing agreement.96
D. COURT DECISIONS
The Commission's victories before the European Court of Justice further increased its
power to impose fines, as the Court upheld the Commission's ability to presume that a
parent company is liable for the acts of its subsidiaries,97 and confirmed that one meeting




On March 2, 2009, the French Competition Authority (the Authority) began executing
its regulatory functions, instituting a new French Competition Law regime in line with
the law on the modernization of the economy of August 4, 200899 and the Order of No-
vember 13, 2008 concerning the modernization of competition regulation.oo The Au-
thority now has almost exclusive jurisdiction to enforce competition law in France. The
primary powers retained by the French Ministry of the Economy are: (i) the power to
94. See European Comm'n, Merger Decisions, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/ (last visited
Feb. 2, 2010).
95. Neelie Kroes, European Comm'r for Competition Policy Antitrust and State Aid Control, European
Comm'n, The Lessons Learned at 36th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Sept.
24, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesActon.do?reference=SPEECH/09/408.
96. See European Comm'n, Antitrust Decisions, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/index.
html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
97. Case C-97/08 P, Akzo Nobel v. Comm'n (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:267:0017:0017:EN:PDF.
98. Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Neth. v. Comm'n (June 4, 2009), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri
Serv/LexUriServ.douri=OJ:C:2009:180:0012:0013:EN:PDF.
* The contribution for France was written by Frangois Brunet and Eric Paroche of Cleary, Gottlieb,
Steen & Hamilton.
99. Law No. 2008-776 of August 4, 2008, Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise [.O.] [Official Ga-
zette of France], Aug. 5, 2008, at 12471, available at http://www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr/frameset.htm.
100. Order No. 2008-1161 of November 13, 2008 Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise [.0.1 [Offi-
cial Gazette of France], Nov. 14, 2008, at 17391, available at http://www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr/frameset,
html.
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request the Authority to carry out a phase-two investigation with respect to a merger
transaction authorized by the Authority in phase one, (ii) the power to overrule, for gen-
eral interest purposes, a negative phase-two decision, and (iii) the power to enforce settle-
ments in response to anticompetitive practices affecting "a market of a local dimension" in
France.101
B. MERGERS
Between March 2, 2009 and November 24, 2009, the Authority issued sixty clearance
decisions,102 three of which were subject to commitments. The most interesting case was
a phase-one decision issued on June 22, 2009, which cleared the merger between French-
based mutual banks Caisse d'Epargne and Banque Populaire, subject to commitments
concerning the Reunion Island.03 Because the parties would have struggled to find a
suitable purchaser in the event of any remedy requiring divestments, the Authority ac-
cepted the parties' commitment to keep their respective Reunion Island branch networks
strictly separate from a legal and operational perspective for five years.
C. ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Having imposed total fines of C575.4 million (approximately US$863.1 million) for a
cartel in the steel industry in December 2008,104 the Authority fined Manpower, Adecco,
and VediorBis a total of C94.4 million (approximately US$141.5 million) on February 2,
2009, for exchanging price information in the French temporary employment services
market.105 On September 29, 2009,106 the Paris Court of Appeals refused to grant a re-
duction in fines for firms who had suffered solely from declining revenues in the context
of the current economic crisis, and lowered fines for just two companies, one of which was
in receivership and the other in liquidation.
D. COURT CASES
On February 4, 2009, the Paris Court of Appeals confirmed the "serious blow" suffered
by Orange in December 2008 when the Authority granted interim relief suspending Or-




102. All of these were phase-one decisions.
103. Dicision n. 09-DCC-16 du 22 juin 2009 relative I la fusion entre les groupes Caisse d'pargne et
Banque Populaire [Decision No. 09-DCC-016 on the Merger of the Banque Populaire and Caisse d'Epargne
Groups] (June 22, 2009), available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/09DCCl6decisionver-
sionpublication.pdf.
104. D6cision n. 08-D-32 du 16 dlcembre 2008 relative I des pratiques mises en oeuvre dans le secteur du
n6goce des produits sid6rurgiques [Decision No. 08-D-32 on Practices in the Steel Trading Industry] (Dec.
16, 2008), available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/08d32.pdf
105. D6cision n. 09-D-05 du 2 fivrier 2009 relative I des pratiques mises en oeuvre dans le secteur du travail
temporaire [Decision No. 09-D-05 on Practices in the Temporary Employment Sector] (Feb. 2, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdflavis/09d05.pdf.
106. Cour d'appel [CA] Paris, P61e 5 ch. 5-7, Sept. 29, 2009, R.G. No. 2008/12495, available at http://
fsffrance.org/news/arret-ca-paris-16.09.2009.pdf.
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ange's exclusivity for the distribution of the current iPhone and reduced Orange's exclu-
sivity for the distribution of future models to three months. 0 7 Apple and Orange
appealed but the Paris Court of Appeals considered these measures to be justified and
proportionate, particularly because the specific investments made by Orange for the
launch of Apple's iPhone in France had been largely recouped.
Apple and Orange made commitments, however, to the Authority within the framework
of the procedure on the merits on November 3, 2009. Apple undertook not to enter into
contracts containing exclusivity clauses with French mobile phone companies or distribu-
tors of the iPhone-save for the distribution of future models-on the understanding that
exclusivity would be limited strictly to three months. Orange undertook not to claim
exclusivity on the distribution of the current iPhone, and to resist the introduction of
exclusivity clauses exceeding three months in distribution contracts for future models.
These 3-year commitments are currently being market tested.
II. Germany*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A new domestic turnover threshold for merger notifications to the Federal Cartel Of-
fice (FCO) was introduced. Since March 25, 2009, transactions now require prior notifi-
cation to the FCO if, during the previous business year, the parties have combined global
revenues of more than C500 million (approximately US$749.5 million), at least one party
has revenues in Germany of more than C25 million (approximately US$37.4 million),
and-the new requirement-one other party has revenues in Germany of more than C5
million (approximately US$7.4 million). 08 As expected, the new threshold has led to a
significant decrease in merger notifications.1 09
B. MERGERS
Substantial fines for violating the standstill obligation continue to be applied. On Feb-
ruary 13, 2009, the FCO imposed a fine of C4.1 million (approximately US$6.1 million)
on the publishing house Druck-und Verlagshaus Frankfurt am Main GmbH for failure to
notify of the acquisition of the publishing company Frankfurter Stadtanzeiger GmbH in
2001.110
107. No. 08-MC-01 (Interim Measures Decision on practices engaged in by Orange and Apple for iPhone
sales in France of December 17, 2008) Cour d'appel [CA] Paris, le ch., Feb. 4, 2009, R.G. No. 2008/23828
and 2009/00003.
* The contribution for Germany was written by Susanne Zuehlke and Dr. Jan Philipp Komossa of
Latham & Watkins.
108. See Act Against Restraints of Competition, July 15, 2005 BGBI. I at 2114, §35 para. I (F.R.G.), available
at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/GWB/091 _GWS_7_NovelleE.pdf.
109. Based on discussions with FCO officials [detailed figures not yet available].
I10. See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Publishing House Druck- und Verlagshaus Frankfurt am Main
GmbH Fined for Violating the Prohibition of Putting a Concentration into Effect (Feb. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/Presse/090213_DuV-Bussgeld e.pdf.
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The FCO published the interim results of its fuel sector inquiry,11- which started in
2008. The FCO found that high vertical and horizontal concentration prevails in the fuel
sector, seriously impeding further competition. The FCO's first post-inquiry measure
was to prohibit the proposed takeover of OMV petrol stations by the German oligopolist
Total Deutschland.112
Other notable transactions reviewed by the FCO in 2009 include a major airline merger
(cleared), a merger between two sugar producers (cleared subject to a condition precedent)
and a proposed merger between two holding companies in the hospital sector
(prohibited)." 3
C. ANTrCOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The FCO imposed fines totaling C41.4 million (approximately US$61 million) on
Westfalen AG and Propan Rheingas GmbH & Co. KG for restraining competition in the
market for tank and bottled gas through customer protection agreements and accompany-
ing price agreements, from at least 1997 until May 2005.114 Fines were also imposed on
hearing aid and contact lens manufacturers for using undue pressure to ensure that retail-
ers applied the recommended retail price.
On June 26, 2009, the Disseldorf Higher Regional Court significantly reduced the
fines imposed by the FCO on five cement manufacturers for concluding long-term quota
agreements. The Court almost halved the fines, from C649 million (approximately
US$973 million) to C328.5 million (approximately US$492.5 million)."t5
111. See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Publishes Interim Report on Fuel Sector In-
quiry (uly 2, 2009), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/Presse/
PM ZwischenberichtKraftstoffe_E.pdf.
112. See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Takes First Measures Following its Fuel Sector
Inquiry and Prohibits Total from Acquiring 59 OMV Petrol Stations (Apr. 29, 2009), available at http://www.
bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdflPresse/090429JTotal-OMV final engl.pdf.
113. See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Clears Acquisition of TUIfly's City-Carrier
Business by Air Berlin (Sept. 8, 2009), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/
Presse/090908_PMAirBerlinTUIFlyE.pdf; Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Nordzucker May Only Ac-
quire Danisco Sugar Without the Anklam Production Site (Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.
bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdflPresse/090217_Nordzucker-Daniscol-e.pdf; Press Release,
Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Merger Between Municipal Hospitals in Hesse Gune 16,
2009), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdflPresse/090618 -KHNordhes-
senPresseerklaerung E.pdf.
114. See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Imposes Multi-million Fines Against Further
Liquefied Gas Suppliers (Apr. 15, 2009), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglischfNews/
Archiv/ArchivNews2009/2009_04 1 5.php.
115. See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Disseldorf Higher Regional Court Confirms Bundeskartellamt
Decision in Fine Proceedings against Cement Manufacturers (June 29, 2009), available at http-//www.
bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/Presse/090629_OLGZement.pdf.
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D. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Private companies frequently file antitrust suits in German courts"16 and such actions
were boosted on April 7, 2009, when the German Supreme Court confirmed that "bun-
dled" damages claims brought by a single plaintiff are permissible under German law."17
In March 2009, the Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) brought another action against the
alleged members of the hydrogen peroxide cartel. According to press reports, Degussa,
who applied for leniency, has already settled with the CDC, which would be the first
settlement of its kind.ilS
IV. Italy*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In July 2009, new rules entered into force concerning collective damages actions for
consumers and final users who are the victims of unfair trade practices or anti-competitive
conduct." 9
B. MERGERS
In March 2009, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) cleared the takeover by Is-
tituto Centrale delle Banche Popolari Italiane (ICBPI) of SI Holding in the market for
credit card marketing, after accepting ICBPI's commitments.1 20
C. ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The ICA accepted the commitments proposed by the parties following investigations
into possible anti-competitive conducts concerning (i) the sector for payment services;121
(ii) the market for liquefied petroleum gas trading and logistics;122 and (iii) automotive
sporting events and competitions management. 23
116. See, e.g., Kammergericht Berlin [Appellate Judgment] Oct. 1, 2009, Case 2 U 10/03 [not yet published]
(relating to a follow-on claim concerning a Berlin transport cement that was fined on October 25, 1999 by the
FCO. The court awarded approximately C650,000 (approximately US$974,000) in damages.).
117. See also Alexander Rinne & Tatjana Muhlbach, MONDAQ.COM, Sept. 24, 2009, http://74.125.95.132/
search?q=cache:iq4fVUlixqYJ:www.mondaq.com/article.asp%3Farticleid%3D86490+Federal+Supreme+
Court+[Order]+Apr.+7,+2009,+Case+KZR+42/08&cd= I &hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a.
118. See Degussa Settles CDC's Hydrogen Peroxide Damage Claim, MLEx, available at http://www.mlex.com/
Content.aspx?ID=72860 (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
* The contribution for Italy was written by Alberto Pera and Valentina Caticchio of Gianni, Origoni,
Grippo & Partners.
119. See Consumer Code, [CC], Sept. 6, 2005, Official Gazette (Oct. 8, 2005, No. 235), art. 140-bis, Legis-
lative Decree No. 206, as amended Law No. 99, July 23, 2009, Official Gazette Ouly 31, 2009, No. 176), art.
49 (Italy).
120. Italian Competition Authority [hereinafter ICA], Mar. 26, 2009, n. C9817, Decision No. 19689, Is-
tituto Centrale delle Banche Popolari Italiane/Si Holding.
121. ICA, Apr. 9, 2009, n. 1704, Decision No. 19726, Assegni Mav-Commissioni Interbancarie.
122. ICA, May 20, 2009, n. C1707, Decision No. 19886, FVH-Liquigas-Butangas-Quiris/l.Pe.M.
123. ICA, June 11, 2009, n. A396, Decision No. 19946, Gargano Corse/Aci.
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The ICA imposed fines in different infringement cases: (i) coordination relating to the
provision of general cashier services by a group of Italian banks;124 (ii) price fixing for the
provision of container-handling services in ports;125 (iii) price fixing among Italian pasta
producers;126 and (iv) anti-competitive arrangements in the lead battery recycling indus-
try.127 The ICA closed the investigation into the market for public auction sales for lack
of evidence of anticompetitive practices.1 28
D. ABUSES OF A DoMvNANT POSETON
To date, there has been only one ICA decision in 2009 concerning abuse of a dominant
position in the market for dry docks supply services in the port of Naples.' 2 9 Among the
pending cases, it is worth highlighting the investigation of an alleged abuse by Google
Italy regarding the provision of online search services.130
E. COURT DECISIONS
The Council of State stated that the mere acquisition of a commercial license does not
automatically constitute a "concentration" under the Italian Competition Act. Mere li-
censes would not constitute "an undertaking or a part of an undertaking" to which market
turnover can be clearly attributed (March 2009).131
The Lazio Regional Administrative Court quashed the decision on anti-competitive
conduct by which the ICA accepted the commitments submitted by some motorway man-
agement companies,132 considering that the measures rendered binding by the ICA were
disproportionate to the antitrust concerns raised during the investigation held in May
2009.133
124. ICA, Dec. 11, 2008, n. 1686, Decision No. 19251, Inail/Affidamento Servizio di Cassa.
125. ICA, Jan. 29, 2009, n. 1685, Decision No. 19462, Costa Container Lines/Sintermar-Terminal Darsena
Toscana.
126. ICA, Feb. 25, 2009, n. 1694, Decision No. 19562, Listino Prezzi Della Pasta.
127. ICA, Apr. 29, 2009, n. 1697, Decision No. 19814, Riciclaggio Delle Batterie Esauste.
128. ICA, Sept. 23, 2009, n. 1705, Decision No. 20318, Case d'asta.
129. ICA, Oct. 28, 2009, n. A405, Decision No. 20412, La Nuova Meccanica Navale/Cantieri del
Mediterraneo.
130. ICA, Aug. 26, 2009, n. A420, Decision No. 20224, Fieg-Federazione Italiana Editori Giornali/Google.
131. Council of State Judgment, Mar. 31 2009, n. 1894, Lidl (quashing the first instance ruling of Lazio
Regional Administrative CourtJudgment, Mar. 19, 2008, N. 2478 and the ICA's initial decision); see also ICA,
May 10, 2007, n. C8094, Decision No. 16809, Lidl, Italia/Rami d'azienda.
132. ICA, Oct. 23, 2008, n. A391, Decision No. 19021, Servizi di soccorso autostradale.
133. Lazio Regional Administrative Court, May 8, 2009, Judgment n. 4994.
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V. Russia*
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In 2009, the Russian Competition Law (Competition Law),134 the Code of Administra-
tive Offenses of Russia (Code of Administrative Offenses),1ss and the Criminal Code of
Russia (Criminal Code)136 underwent significant changes. The amendments introduced
are known as "the Second Antimonopoly Package." 37
Particularly, these amendments extend the scope of the Competition Law to agree-
ments executed or actions taken outside Russia and broaden the powers of the Federal
Antimonopoly Service (the FAS) of the Russian Federation. 38
In addition, an undertaking can now be declared dominant with a market share of less
than thirty-five percent, provided it has a larger share than other undertakings and it can
significantly influence competition in Russia.' 39 The Competition Law introduces new
definitions of monopolistic prices, setting detailed criteria for determining when prices are
monopolistic.140 The limitation period for breach of the Competition Law is also ex-
tended from one to three years.' 4'
With regards to merger control, the thresholds for transactions subject to preliminary
antimonopoly clearance or post-transaction notification have been almost doubled.142
Furthermore, the list of documents and information to be submitted to the FAS has been
extended to include, inter alia, information on the ultimate (beneficial) owners of the
acquirer.143
In accordance with amendments introduced to Article 14.32 of the Code of Administra-
tive Offenses, execution of and participation in restrictive agreements, engaging in con-
certed practices, and coordination of economic activity are subject to fines of one to
fifteen percent of the company's turnover in the market where the violation occurred.144
Amended Article 178 of the Criminal Code imposes criminal liability, such as fines of up
to RUR1 million (approximately US$34,200) and up to seven years imprisonment for
* The contribution for Russia was written by Vassily Rudomino from Alrud.
134. Federal Law on Protection of Competition, No. 135-FZ, 2006, as amended (initially published in Ros.
gaz. No. 162, July 27, 2006), available at http://base.garant.ru/12148517.htm.
135. Code of Administrative Offenses, No. 195-FZ, as amended (initially published in Ros. gaz. No. 256,
2001), available at http://base.garant.ru/12125267.htm.
136. Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] No.245-FZ, as amended (initially published in Ros. gar.
No.113,June 18, 1996, No. 114,June 19, 1996, No. 115,June 20, 1996and No. 118,June 25, 1996),available
at http://base.garant.ru/10108000.htm.









144. Eugenia Borzilo, No. 61 Enhanced Administrative and Criminal Liability for Violations of the Anti-Monopoly
Legislation, GOLTsBLAT, Aug. 10, 2009, http-J/www.gblplaw.com/newslegaV417/.
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prevention, restriction, and elimination of competition if such actions have caused serious
damage to citizens, companies, and the state or involved large-scale profit-making.14s
According to new leniency provisions, only the first company notifying the FAS will
obtain immunity.'46 Other cartel members will face turnover fines, and criminal liability
may be imposed on senior management of the offending companies.147
B. ANIcoMPETrIvE PRACTICES
The FAS imposed a fine of RUR2 5,269,000 (approximately US$864,000) on one of the
largest operators in the oil products wholesale market in several regions for engaging in
concerted practices.148 The FAS established that Gazpromneft-Kuzbass CJSC and
Tomsknefteproduct VNK OJSC "maintained the same price level and simultaneously in-
creased retail prices for motor petrol and diesel fuel in the Tomsk oil products retail mar-
ket." 49 On June 3, 2009, the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District
confirmed the FAS's decision. 50
C. ABUSE OF A DomiNANT PosrioN
In November 2009, the FAS found that Lukoil OJSC and a number of companies in its
group had abused their dominant position in the wholesale markets for motor petrol,




Two new Regulations, one on leniency5 2 and the other on fines imposed for anticom-
petitive activities, 5 3 were published in 2009. Although not previously defined in the Pro-
tection of Competition Act No. 4054,154 leniency was applied in practice in similar terms
to those now set out in the Regulation. With regards to the Fines Regulation, it aims to
increase transparency but will change little in practice.
145. Kiran S. Desai & Elena Klonitskaia, Russian Federation: Russia Introduces Criminal Sanctions for Breaches of
Competition Las, MONDAQ, Dec. 7, 1009, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=90176.
146. See Voeyodin, supra note 137.
147. Id.
148. See Press Release, FAS (Sept. 8, 2009), available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/news/n_26421.shtml.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Press Release, FAS (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/news/n_27693.shtnl.
* The contribution for Turkey was written by Selin Beceni of Luther Karasek K6ksal.
152. Regulation on Active Cooperation for Detecting Cartels, No. 27142, Official Gazette, Feb. 15, 2009,
(Turk.), available at http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/dosyalar/yonetmelik/yonetnelik8.pdf.
153. Regulation on Fines in Cases of Agreements, Concerted Practices, and Decisions Limiting Competi-
tion, and Abuses of a Dominant Position, No. 27142, Official Gazette, Feb. 15, 2009, (Turk.), available at
http-//www.rekabet.gov.tr/dosyalar/yonetmelik/yonetmelik9.pdf.
154. Protection of Competition Act, No. 4054, Dec. 7, 1994, Official Gazette No. 22140, Dec. 13, 1994,
(Turk.), available at http-//www.rekabet.gov.tr/dosyalar/belgeler/belge7/kanun.pdf.
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B. MERGERS
In 2008 and until October 2009, the Competition Board issued eighty-three deci-
sions 55 reflecting a significant decrease in the number of transactions. Many decisions
concern international transactions that have an indirect effect on Turkey through the par-
ties' subsidiaries.156
C. ANTlCOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
In the telecommunications sector,157 Turk Telekom A.S. (the incumbent telecommuni-
cations operator) and its subsidiary TT Net A.S. (an internet service provider) were fined
approximately US$8 million for abuse of a dominant position in the internet broadband
market. 58 Turk Telecom was found to have engaged in price squeezing by selling broad-
band internet access services, while TTNET, a subsidiary of Turk Telecom, was involved
in predatory pricing in the downstream market. 5 9
The Competition Board also ruled on usufruct rights in the oil business.160 It decided
that a usufruct agreement with a term of more than five years, which was standard practice
in the industry, amounted to a de facto illegal non-compete clause.' 6 ' The term of the




The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) published the final version of its new jurisdictional
and procedural guidance on mergers in June 2009,163 which reflects its practices since the
155. Rekabet Kurumu, Competition Board Decisions, REKABET.Gov, http://www.rekabet.gov.tr (last visited
Mar. 29, 2010).
156. Decision 09-33/762-182 Wyeth Inc.-Pfizer Inc. (uly 15, 2009); Decision 09-31/678-159 Chrysler
LLC-Fiat S.p.A. Guly 1, 2009); Decision 09-14/320-84 Austrian Airlines AG - Deutsche Lufthansa AG, (Apr.
13, 2009); Decision 09-01/3-3 Siemens AG-Fujitsu Limited, Gan. 8, 2009), available at http-//www.rekabet.
gov.tr/index.phpSayfa=kararenliste.
157. Decision 09-07/127-38 Turk Telekom Inc., (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/
dosyalar/kararlaren/kararen68.doc.
158. OECD, Policy Roundtables: Regulating Market Activities by the Public Sector, 243 (2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/5/34305974.pdf
159. Id.
160. Decision 09-09/186-56 Pol-Pet Petroleum Products Tourism Accommodation and Recreation Facili-
ties Co. Ltd, (Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/dosyalar/kararlaren/kararen70.doc.
161. Id.
162. Id.
* The contribution for the United Kingdom was written by Stephen Kon, Gordon Christian, and Jai
Bhakar of SJ Berwin.
163. See Press Release, OFT, OFT publishes revised guidance on Merger jurisdiction and procedure (June
30, 2009), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2009/76-09.
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Enterprise Act 2002 came into force. In addition, merger fees payable to the OFT have
been doubled.M
B. ANTrCOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
September saw the conclusion of the OFT's long-running construction cartel inquiry.
The OFT fined 103 companies a total of £129.5 million (approximately US$213 million)
for bid-rigging between 2000 and 2006.165 The bid-rigging was mainly carried out
through the practice of cover pricing in order to create the misleading impression of com-
petition for contracts.166 In a separate cartel case relating to the construction recruitment
sector, the OFT fined six companies £39.27 million (approximately US$64.6) for engag-
ing in anti-competitive behavior by excluding a new market entrant. 167
Four former British Airways executives were also prosecuted for their alleged participa-
tion in a cartel with Virgin Atlantic that fixed prices for fuel surcharges on long-haul
passenger flights.168 If found guilty, the four could face up to five years in prison, unlim-
ited fines, director disqualification orders, and confiscation of any unlawfully gained
assets.169
C. COURT DECISIONS
The Competition Commission (CC) has lost two court cases this year regarding the
proportionality of remedies following market investigations. In another market investiga-
tion case, BAA has appealed 70 against the CC's remedy requiring airport divestitures after
the CC decided that BAA's ownership of airports throughout the UK raised significant
competition issues.' 7'
In competition litigation developments, Ian Norris, the former CEO of Morgan Cruci-
ble, is due to appear in the High Court to appeal against his extradition to the United
States to face charges that he obstructed the U.S. Department of Justice's investigation
into a cartel in which he was allegedly involved. The extradition was ordered notwith-
standing a House of Lords' judgment that Mr. Norris could not be extradited only for
price fixing charges brought in the United States, as this was not a criminal offense in the
UK at the relevant time.172
164. Statement, OFT, OFT Merger Fee Statement (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/ad-
viceand_ resources/publications/guidance/mergers/merger-fees.
165. Press Release, OFT, Construction firms fined for illegal bid-rigging (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://
www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2009/114-09.
166. Id.
167. Press Release, OFT, OFT Fines Recruitment Agencies for a Collective Boycott and Price Fixing Cartel
(Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2009/119-09.
168. See Press Release, OFT, OFT Announces Criminal Charges in Airline Fuel Surcharges Cartel Case
(Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2008/93-08.
169. Id.
170. Summary of Application Under Section 179 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (May 22, 2009) Competition
Appeal Tribunal, Case Number 1110/6/8/09, available at http://www.caibunal.org.uk/files/ll10_BAAjudg-
ment_21.12.09.pdf.
171. Press Release, CC, BAA Ordered to Sell Three Airports (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://www.com-
petition-commission.org.uk/pressrel/2009/mar/pdf/ 11-09.pdf.
172. See Ian Norris v. Gov't of tbe United States of America [20091 EWHC 995.
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On the subject of representative actions, two flower importers have appealed to the
Court of Appeal from the High Court's decision opposing the inclusion of a representa-





Significant amendments to the Competition Act 1998 (the Act) were signed into law in
August 2009.173 These amendments include a prohibition on conduct by firms in a com-
plex monopoly and the introduction for the first time in South Africa of criminal liability
for directors and managers who are personally responsible for, or even knowingly acqui-
esce in, hardcore antitrust infringements.17 4
Increases in the monetary thresholds for compulsory merger filings led to a reduction in
the number of transactions notified to the competition authorities as intermediate and
large mergers. The CC also published new guidelines on the notification of small merg-
ers, which request parties to small merger transactions to notify the Commission in cer-
tain cases.175
B. MERGERS
The vast majority of transactions were approved by the CC, mostly without conditions.
A number of transactions were approved subject to conditions intended to ameliorate
their effect on employment in South Africa.
The CC prohibited the proposed intermediate merger between Masscash Holdings
(Pty) Ltd and Finro Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (trading as Finro Cash & Carry), however, on
the basis that it would substantially prevent and/or lessen competition in the market for
the wholesaling of grocery products in the Port Elizabeth region and surrounding
arC2s.176
C. ANTrCOMPETTIVE PRACTICES
A significant number of cartel cases resulted from applications for leniency under the
Commission's Corporate Leniency Policy (CLP). The Commission initiated investiga-
tions into anticompetitive conduct in the South African construction sector (particularly
The contribution for South Africa was written by Heather Irvine of Deneys Reitz.
173. Competition Amendment Act I of 2009, Government Gazette 32433 of Aug. 28, 2009, available at
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id= 106306.
174. Id. § 73A.
175. See The Competition Commission Website, Guideline on the Notification of Small Mergers, http://
www.compcom.co.za/how-to-file-a-merger-link/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
176. See Press Release, CC, Competition Commission Blocks Masscash and Finro Merger (May 25, 2009),
available at http-J/www.compcom.co.zalassets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/25-May-09-Competi-
tion-Conmmission-blocks-Masscash-and-Finro-merger.pdf.
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involving collusive tendering) 77 and the petroleum value chain; 78 price fixing by bicycle
retailers;179 and practices engaged in by the major South African supermarket chains. 80
In addition, the Competition Tribunal decided cases about abuses of dominance in the
grain, flat steel, and tobacco industries, among others.181
177. See Press Release, CC, Competition Commission Requests Fines for Steel Companies and Initiates
Construction Sector Investigation (Sept. 1, 2009), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/At-
tachedFiles/MyDocuments/01-Sept-09-Competition-Commission-requests-fines-for-steel-companies-and-
initiates.pdf.
178. See Press Release, CC, Competition Commission Initiates Complaints in Piped Gas and Petroleum
Products (Jan. 19, 2009), available at http://www.compcom.co.zalassets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocu-
ments/19-Jan-09-Competition-Commission-initiates-complaints-in-piped-gas-and-petroleum-products.pdf.
179. See Press Release, CC, Competition Commission Uncovers Bike Retailer Cartel (Mar. 5, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/05-Mar-09-Competition-
Commission-uncovers-bike-retailer-cartel.pdf.
180. See Press Release, CC, Competition Commission to Probe the Supermarket Industry (une 29, 2009),
available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/29-June-09-Competi-
tion-Commission-to-probe-the-supermarket-industry.pdf.
181. See The Competition Tribunal South Africa, http://www.comptrib.co.za (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
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